There's nothing like a picture of pig intestines being sorted in China to dramatize the fears that outsourcing is jeopardizing the safety of the US drug supply.
The picture to the right is just one in a series posted on-line today by the Wall Street Journal, showing the first step in the production process for heparin, one of the mostly widely used hospital pharmaceutical products in the US. (You can see the rest of the pictures here if you have the stomach).
You can expect those photos of the heparin production process to show up again, any time someone wants to question the impact of manufacturing outsourcing in the pharmaceutical industry. Like maybe when House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee chair Rosa DeLauro holds a hearing on drug safety issues (and especially the Trasylol controversy) February 27.
The photos accompany a lengthy discussion of the investigation into an apparent increase in adverse reactions associated with Baxter's heparin product, which has been recalled in the US. The Chicago Tribune also weighs in with a story including some comments from Baxter CEO Robert Parkinson.
Now, bear in mind that no one knows for sure at this point that the Chinese facility has anything to do with the heparin adverse events. Not that that will make too big of a difference in how much damage the story will do to confidence in FDA, the industry and the drug supply.
First came the embarrassing admission by FDA that it never inspected the plant in China that serves as one raw material supplier for the product in question. That prompted a key overseer of FDA--Michigan Democrat Bart Stupak--to call for the resignation of Commissioner Andrew von Eschenbach.
But Baxter may face some tough questions of its own--at least based on comments made by top agency enforcement officials during a Food & Drug Law Institute conference February 19-20. According to the Tribune, Parkinson says Baxter wasn't even aware that the plant in question was part of its supply chain, since it was a subcontractor to the firm Baxter relied on for bulk API.
David Elder, director of the agency's Office of Enforcement, pointed out that FDA believes it is the responsibility of the finished dose product manufacturer to assure the quality of its products. He was responding specifically to a question about components of medical devices, not heparin. But he pointedly expanded to his answer to include finished dose pharmaceutical manufacturers being responsible for their suppliers.
Deputy Chief Counsel for Litigation Eric Blumberg also discussed the agency's ability to hold individual corporate executives criminally responsible for allowing adulterated products on the market. The authority--known as the Park doctrine after a Supreme Court ruling upholding the principle--allows FDA to file misdemeanor cases against executives even if there is no evidence of intent or even knowledge of GMP violoations.
The principle, Blumberg reminded FDLI, is that an executive has at least the opportunity to prevent a dangerous product from entering the market, while consumers cannot protect themselves from a contaminated drug once it is in distribution.
If Congress does look more broadly at supply-chain responsibility, things could get really interesting.
Both the Journal and the Tribune quote American Pharmaceutical Products Inc. CEO Patrick Soon-Shiong, asserting the advantages of his company's approach to supply chain management. APP is the big winner (if there is one) in the heparin recall, since its product is now the only one available.
Soon-Shiong has been in the news before. APP was the subject of a front page story in the New York Times in 2002 because of its relationship with the group purchasing organization Premier; that was during a time when Congress was looking into GPO practices following allegations by small device manufacturers that they were being shut out of the market.
Before that, Soon-Shiong played a part in the controversy surrounding generic launches of Bristol-Myers Squibb's paclitaxel (Taxol). APP asserted that a patent it held on a cremaphor free formulation of paclitaxel should block generics of the Bristol product. The issue briefly delayed generic launches and prompted a Federal Trade Commission inquiry. (Bristol ultimately settled a series of antitrust claims regarding its patent defense strategies for several brands; APP was never charged.)
One last thing: APP also has first-hand experience with the challenges of global supply chain management. The company acquired its injectable generic product line from Fujisawa USA in the 1990s. Shortly after the acquisition, APP had to recall injectable gentamicin due to endotoxin contamination. The culprit? A Chinese raw material supplier.
Soon-Shiong should make an interesting witness...
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