Nektar Takes A Deep Breath

Deep breath in. Deep breath out. Nektar execs, have you found your quiet place, yet?

It's been a stressful few months for Nektar employees. The company's 13-year marriage with Pfizer soured last October when the pharma unexpectedly decided to stop selling its inhaled insulin Exubera. True, Pfizer did cough up a hefty divorce settlement--a $135 million forgive-me gift, plus a promise to help with insulin supply and on-going clinical trials. (For more on the future of inhaled insulin, see here.)

Yesterday came the news that Nektar is eliminating approximately 150 positions--110 existing jobs plus 40 unfilled openings--as it restructures the company to "transition form a drug delivery service provider to a therapuetics drug development organization." In addition, the company announced that Hoyoung Huh, the company's COO and head of its pegylation business unit, is leaving to become CEO of BiPar Sciences, an up-and-coming biotech developing oncology therapies.

We've said it before. (No doubt, we'll say it again.) It's a terrible time to be in drug delivery. Making money in this space has always been tough--it's not enough anymore to take an existing molecule and dress it up with a PEG molecule to extend its shelf-life or aerosolize it for delivery to the lungs. Payers and physicians want proof that a new formulation isn't just convenient, but that it's superior to existing available medicines. As David Steinberg, an analyst with Deutsche Bank, told START UP in December: "The old model of drug delivery is completely broken down. To be successful you have to think far more innovatively."

Thing is, it takes a lot of money--and risk--to engineer a delivery system robust enough to deliver a real therapeutic advantage. Look at the field's lone success story in recent years--XenoPort. The company's share price has increased more than six-fold since its 2005 IPO, thanks to the success of its gabapentin pro-drug, XP13512, for restless leg syndrome and neuropathic pain. Last February GlaxoSmithKline agreed to fork over $75 million in cash and another $500 million in development, regulatory, and sales milestones for the compound. (Just for the record, Xenoport raised approximately $270 million in equity capital and another $160 million from partners to get enough data to convince the pharma of XP13512's value.)

So, the big lesson from XenoPort's success? Delivery technology ain't enough. XenoPort was only able to sign this monster deal with GSK because XP13512 is a new chemical entity with hard-to-duplicate molecular advantages. (The nifty formulation technology is an added bonus to investors -- a key part of its discovery platform.)

Of course, there is a corollary to this lesson (This IS a Windhover publication.) To be successful in drug delivery today means spending research dollars on two fronts: not only do you have to spend money to engineer the delivery system, but you also have to spend money to discover and develop novel, first-in-class or best-in-class compounds. Which leads this IN VIVO blogger to wonder, why even bother with the delivery piece of the puzzle?

Seem's like Nektar's board and CEO, Howard Robin, have been asking the same question. As part of the company's restructuring, Robin noted in a press release that "We are transforming Nektar into a world-class drug development company."

My friends and colleagues know I'm a big believer in the "I think I can" strategy. But it's tough to see how Nektar's transformation will occur near term. True, the company's inhaled amikacin, which is being co-developed with Bayer AG, is expected to enter Phase III clinical trials later this year, and its two leading PEGylated small molecule programs, PEG-irinotecan and oral PEG-naloxol, just entered Phase II clinical trials. But will there be the leadership to push these two products through development now that Nektar's PEG champion and resident brainiac, Hoyoung Huh, is jumping ship to take the helm of BiPar Sciences?

Maybe "the decision to step down as COO was a difficult one," as Huh asserts in another press release issued today. After all, he hasn't severed ties with the company completely. He'll be serving on the company's Board of Directors until 2009 or until a replacement has been identified according to SEC documents. Or maybe, Huh, whose CV lists an MD, a PhD, and a stint as a McKinsey partner, saw the darkening skies and approaching stormy seas and left for the relatively calmer waters of private biotech.

February 27 should be an interesting day. That's when Nektar will release results for the fourth quarter and full year of 2007. Meantime, Nektar employees, remember: deep breath in; deep breath out.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Transguyjay through a creative commons license.

Novo Scraps Inhaled Insulin

The dismal failure of Pfizer/Nektar’s Exubera loudly called into question whether inhaled mealtime insulin was commercially viable at all.

The answer—surprise, surprise--is that it’s not, at least according to Novo Nordisk. The Danish firm announced last night that it was scrapping its Phase III inhaled insulin program, which uses Aradigm’s AERx liquid aerosol system.

The slight irony here is that the (already painfully delayed) AERx program was killed because it failed to show “sufficient clinical or convenience benefits” over the various insulin analogs already available to patients—including, prominently, those using Novo’s own FlexPen, a discreet and simple-to-use injection device.

Novo’s decision doesn’t mean that other late-stage inhaled insulin wannabes, including Lilly/Alkermes and MannKind will follow suit. But as we argued in this IN VIVO feature, Pfizer’s snafu means the going will be tough. Novo was at best going to be third to market, and the brick-sized device (far larger than Lilly/Alkermes’) had long been recognized as a problem—that’s why Novo had begun a next-generation program in-house. And the product required refrigeration.

So the writing was on the wall. In fact it’s somewhat of a relief that Novo has finally put this long and expensive project to bed, taking a non-recurring cost of about $260 million (DKK 1.3 billion), which will hit 2007 operating profit. Mads Krogsgaard Thomsen, CSO and EVP of Novo Nordisk had already last year acknowledged that “this is not going to be a huge product.” Now it won’t be one at all.

Not that this spells the end of pulmonary delivery for Novo. The problem with all of the current batch of inhaled insulins, according to Thomsen, is that they’re short-acting, meal-time insulins that must be taken alongside basal insulin—the ones available with tiny, pain-free injection devices. Exubera's failure showed that patients (and payors) understandably, were reluctant to add onto that regime something even more complex. And Pfizer, for reasons we outline here, failed to reverse the treatment sequence by persuading physicians to prescribe insulin earlier on.

So given that meal-time insulin is typically a fifth or sixth step in diabetics’ chain of medication (which progresses from diet-and-exercise, through oral anti-diabetic drugs to GLP-1s and then basal insulin) why did drug companies focus their inhaled efforts on this and not basal insulin? “Becase we had no choice,” says Thomsen, technological limitations meant that prandial insulin was the only one which could be formulated for inhalation.

Those limitations are no longer, he continues. Novo now intends to focus on developing pulmonary forms of basal insulin and GLP-1. We outlined in a feature last summer the importance of glucagon-like-peptide (GLP-1) analogs (and Phase III GLP-1 analog liraglutide in particular) to Novo’s business, so it’s no surprise that GLP-1s feature in the firm’s fresh set of pulmonary delivery plans.

These are a way from the market, however—liraglutide itself can’t be formulated for inhaled delivery because its half-life is too short; nor can Lilly’s first-to-market Byetta. Still, “we’re not starting from scratch, either; we have an inhaled, bioavailable GLP-1 candidate in late-preclinical trials,” asserted Thomsen on a conference call following today’s news.

Novo’s shares were down nearly 4% this morning; chances are Aradigm might have a bad day when the US exchange opens. But Novo’s put on a brave face. “We’re going from being followers in a commercially unattractive area, inhaled meal-time insulin, to leaders in a highly commercially-attractive area—a new generation of inhaled long-acting basal insulins and GLP-1 analogs.”

Exubera: Fun with the Classics

(With apologies to Joseph Heller.)

… We will courtmartial you if you turn our deal down, even though it would raise a lot of questions and be a terrible black eye for Colonel Cathcart Kindler.

Colonel Cathcart Kindler winced at the words “black eye” and, without any apparent premeditation, hurled his slender onyx-and-ivory cigarette holder Exubera inhaler down viciously on the wooden surface of his desk. “Jesus Christ Hank McKinnel!” he shouted unexpectedly. “I hate this goddam cigarette holder Exubera inhaler!” The cigarette holder Exubera inhaler bounced off the desk to the wall, ricocheted across the window sill to the floor and came to a stop almost where he was standing. Colonel Cathcart Kindler stared down at it with an irascible scowl. “I wonder if it’s really doing me any good.”

“It’s a feather in your cap with General Peckem Pfizer’s ego, but a black eye for you with General Scheisskopf the investors,” Colonel Korn informed him with a mischievous look of innocence.

“Well, which one am I supposed to please?”

“Both.”

“How can I please them both? They hate each other. How am I ever going to get a feather in my cap from General Scheisskopf the investors without getting a black eye from General Peckem Pfizer’s ego?”

“March Biogen.”

“Yeah, March Biogen. That’s the only way to please him Pfizer’s ego. March Biogen. March Biogen.”

Exdoomera: Why Is Sanofi-Aventis Smiling?

Pfizer CEO Jeff Kindler must have been gritting his teeth as he read out loud the costs of the now-terminated Exubera inhaled insulin product.

Pfizer announced pre-tax charges of $2.8 billion related to the Exubera exit, with approximately $1.1 billion of intangible assets, $661 million of inventory, $454 million of fixed assets and $584 million of other exit costs.

That's a lot of zeros. Exubera, along with the now defunct cholesterylester transfer protein (CETP) agent torcetrapib, were supposed to lead Pfizer into an new age of blockbuster products. Now both programs are in rubble.

There has been a lot of buzz about the titanic failure of Exubera to meet expectations, but seeing the numbers in black and white is, nonetheless, staggering.

Less than two years ago, in January 2006, Pfizer paid Sanofi-Aventis a king's ransom--$1.3 billion--for the full rights to Exubera. Then the company brilliantly navigated the product, which had respiratory safety concerns that stalled its development for years, through an FDA advisory committee and US approval by focusing on a comprehensive risk management plan.

At one point, the drug was projected to be a $2 billion-a-year franchise. In the third quarter, Exubera generated $7 million in revenue. Pfizer took one last shot at jump starting the launch by unveiling a national direct-to-consumer ad campaign earlier this year, but that was throwing good money after bad.

Exubera may have failed for any number of reasons: patients were overly concerned about respiratory side effects; the failure of a primary care sales & marketing effort to make a mark in a specialty pharmaceutical category; or it was simply a bad product for the subset of Type 2 diabetic patients it was trying to serve. And it may have been all of those things together.

In the end though, it looks like Sanofi-Aventis pulled a fast one on Pfizer, Gordon Gecko-style (you have to have seen the movie "Wall Street" to understand this reference), giving up its right to a potential blockbuster only if Pfizer paid a huge premium for the French company's troubles. Someone's laughing all the way to the bank. However, that hit may be a tad easier to take if Pfizer chooses to make a significant run at taking a stake in the French drug maker, as rumor would have it.

For Kindler, this hardly seems like a fair shake for his first year as CEO. Will investors view him as a stoic leader making tough decisions to clean up someone else's mess? They may. However, this could be the last time Kindler gets the benefit of the doubt.

More Insulin Problems

Pfizer isn't the only company having problems with an alternative delivery form of insulin.

Emisphere Technologies has been working on oral insulin for more than a decade--and finally its board got fed up.

In October 2006, the company reported disappointing Phase II results with its oral insulin--no difference from placebo. The stock tumbled by more than 50%. By January the long-time CEO, Michael Goldberg, MD, was out. The firing was led by Mark Rachesky, who joined Emisphere's board in 2005 when his fund, MHR Institutional Partners, loaned the company $15 million, later changing the straight debt to a convert--at $3.78 a share. That's unprofitably close to the company's current stock price (and less than half the Emisphere price when Rachesky did the covert deal).

Goldberg was blamed for poor execution of the key trial (as well as the fact that the company hasn't made much progress in its nearly nineteen years of life). The original trial design called for the oral insulin to be tested in very sick but stable patients; to accelerate the enrollment, the company apparently relaxed the criteria. In a subsegment look at patients who met the original criteria--an often unreliable analysis--oral insulin apparently did perform well. But now the company needs a new trial to prove the point. And this isn't the first trial that wasn't well executed: its oral heparin test was hurt by a poor liquid formulation whose taste turned off patients.

The company is by no means dead--it's managed to hire a new CEO, Michael Novinski, the former president of Organon USA. And it's brought on a board of big-name diabetologists to advise it on trial design and execution. It's got a new formulation with apparently three times the absorption of the older version--thus reducing cost-of-goods and increasing patient convenience.

But oral insulin won't win on convenience. And it won't win by eliminating the pain of injections. New smaller needles make taking insulin relatively painless. The big advantage will be eliminating embarassment, says one insider: "What diabetics hate is at a restaurant having to pull up their shirt and stick themselves in the stomach with a needle." Exubera doesn't solve that problem: puffing on a big device is no less inconspicuous than sticking one's belly with a needle.

A pill should be a lot more acceptable. And yet that's not enough. The market for insulin reformulations is being shaved by better needle technology and by new products, like the injectable Byetta and the oral Januvia. And as Pfizer is learning from Exubera, managed care doesn't want to pay for convenience. Emisphere's product, to be truly important, will have to show better outcomes. It may be able to get on the market by showing equivalency to injectable insulin--but to make Emisphere, and oral insulin, a success, it will need to keep diabetics healthier, too. That's a much more expensive task than most proponents of oral protein delivery ever figured they'd have to accomplish.

Take a Deep Breath, Pfizer, and Think Again

It's just what Pfizer didn't need: another expensive failure.

Less than six months after the much-vaunted Lipitor-replacement torcetrapib tanked, it's now official that the Exubera launch is a flop. The numbers say it, the newspapers say it, and even Pfizer’s own executives acknowledge that “we still need to figure out how to market Exubera.”

Not surprising, perhaps—Pfizer isn’t exactly a large molecule expert, and Exubera, as the first ever inhaled insulin, presents even more challenges for its sponsor than your average biologic.

First, doctors must be convinced of the drug’s advantages over existing treatments; not just longer-acting insulins such as Levemir, marketed by diabetes-leader Novo Nordisk, but also since late 2006, Merck & Co.’s star DPP-4 inhibitor sitagliptin (Januvia), a rare industry success story (to be followed by recently-approved Janumet, a combination of Januvia and metformin).

Then, time-constrained docs must learn how the inhaler device works (and adapt dosages, which are different when insulin is inhaled rather than injected). If they get past that hurdle--and aren’t swayed by detractors such as Dr. John Buse, president-elect of the American Diabetes Association, who says that Exubera may present a safety risk in Type I diabetics--then their patients must get used to carrying an umbrella-sized device around with them (and paying more for the privilege: Exubera costs $2-3 more per day than injectable insulin).

So Exubera is being chosen for just one in 500 insulin prescriptions in the US, despite Pfizer’s investment—900 part-time diabetes educators, over six months of doc-targeted marketing, and considerable sales rep resource, in part diverted from other more profitable drugs. Analysts have slashed Exubera sales forecasts, in some cases to barely more than $300 million by 2012.

But Pfizer’s not giving up. “Don’t write Exubera off,” warns a senior executive at Pfizer. “We’ve screwed up before on launch, and the drug has come back.”

The company will soon launch a fresh marketing campaign, a summer DTC advertising splurge (very unfashionable), and reckons that transferring Exubera promotion to its highly successful CV team might make the difference.

Chances are it won’t. Marketing inhaled insulin—effectively a niche drug, despite initial forecasts of peak-sales of up to $2 billion—isn’t like marketing a primary care pill. You can’t use the same tricks.

“Patients will be inhaling insulin over the next few years,” insist Pfizer executives. Sure, but how many, and whose product? By the time Pfizer figures out its promotional game, competition will be even worse, even if there is a market. The handful of inhaled insulin alternatives in Exubera's wake have smaller, more discreet devices, and will benefit from Pfizer's experience in figuring out how to make breathing in one's insulin more attractive than injecting it.

“You may wonder whether Exubera could be right for you,” says Pfizer’s product website to prospective customers. Despite its brave face, Pfizer must be wondering whether this drug is right for it, too.

Reporting on Exubera: an A-Buse

Many analysts have questioned the potential of Pfizer’s inhaled insulin, Exubera. Nonetheless, it was more than surprising to see the comments about the drug attributed to American Diabetes Association president-elect John Buse, MD, this week.

In a widely circulated AP story on March 21 about Exubera, Buse was quoted saying "I think Pfizer will wish they had never gotten into this. I doubt they'll regain their investment…There is no advantage to Exubera and there may be a safety risk. I see it as my job to talk people out of (using) it."

Buse has spoken to IN VIVO in the past, and we know him to be a highly credible and extremely careful commenter who focuses on medicine and avoids discussion of company issues. His statements on Exubera and Pfizer therefore seemed unusually pointed, all the more so given that he had said “There’s cause for tremendous optimism” following the product’s approval in 2006 for the treatment of type 1 and type 2 diabetes in adults.

When asked in an email last night about the accuracy of the AP story, Buse replied: “Not fair. The comments were specifically about treating type 1 diabetes. Not about treating type 2 diabetes.”

That makes sense. Indeed, last year he pointed out the possibility of a safety risk for type 1 diabetics, who must use Exubera in combination with longer-acting insulin. The inhalation device “is a little too cumbersome to be used in multiple daily therapies like we use in type 1 diabetes, but certainly that would be an option,” he said then, adding that the drug is “mostly going to be used in the type 2 population that's just getting started in the insulin business,” as an alternative to or in combination with rapid-acting insulin injections or oral drugs. Safety issues are also amplified in type 1 patients because “they are likely to be exposed for 50-plus years,” Buse added in his recent email to us.

As for the reported comments about Pfizer’s ability to recoup its investment, he would only say that “I may have said it” in the course of reflecting on the competition Exubera faces in both the type 1 and type 2 markets from Lilly-Amylin’s Byetta, “even better [incretin mimetics] on the horizon, better pens, much greater acceptance of long-acting insulin, increasing price pressure from managed care and the interest in long-term safety demonstration.” --Mark Ratner

Did the AP inhale?